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The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF) is the largest and the most expensive development 
and acquisition program in U.S. Department of Defense (DOD) history, with eight cost-
sharing participant countries—the United Kingdom (U.K.), Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, 
Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway—and a total cost of nearly $400 billion 
(Sullivan, 2016). 
The main objective of the program is to develop and produce the fifth-generation, 
stealth, multi-role fighter that will replace aging fighter, strike, and ground attack 
aircrafts for the United States Navy (USN), Air Force (USAF), Marine Corps (USMC), 
and eight allies (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2000).  
DOD plans to procure 2,457 F-35s in total for its three services (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2016a). In addition, around 500 aircraft are expected to be 
delivered to allied nations, which increases the total number to be produced to almost 
3,000 aircraft (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2016). DOD and the program officials 
anticipate the costs to procure, operate, and maintain the F-35 fleet throughout their 
lifecycle to be over $1 trillion, a number that will be challenging to afford (U.S. 
Government Accountability Office, 2016b).   
Due to its extensive scope and substantial life cycle costs, the JSF program is one 
of the most controversial issues in the United States. This issue however, is not that 
controversial from Turkey’s point of view at the moment. It is mostly because Turkey has 
only ordered six F-35s, not committed a significant amount of funds from its defense 
budget, and not experienced operational issues yet. Nevertheless, it is important to 
analyze Turkey’s involvement in the program in order to have a more comprehensive 
idea about the debate outside the United States.   
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B. PURPOSE 
The purpose of this research is to analyze Turkey’s decision to participate in the 
JSF program using Graham T. Allison’s conceptual models for foreign policy analysis. 
This study addresses a probable rationale behind Turkey’s choice of JSF program to 
procure fifth-generation fighter aircraft that will replace aging aircrafts. The intent of this 
research is not to assess the success of the JSF program from Turkey’s perspective, but 
rather to analyze the JSF program using these conceptual frameworks in order to better 
understand Turkey’s decisions about the JSF, and to provide an example of how the 
frameworks can be used to shed light on weapons system acquisition by U.S. allies. 
C. RESEARCH QUESTIONS 
This research aims to answer the following questions: 
• What are the reasons behind Turkey’s participation in the JSF 
program? 
• How can Graham T. Allison’s conceptual models explain 
Turkey’s decision to participate in the JSF program? 
• How do the Allison models help us understand the 
role of the Turkish Air Force’s history and 
organizational culture in Turkey’s decision to 
participate the JSF program? 
• How should we understand Turkey’s decisions on 
the JSF program through the rational actor model? 
D. SCOPE 
The scope of this study is limited to foreign policy aspects of the program, 
especially from Turkey’s perspective. This research does not analyze program 





This research incorporates a literature review, data collection, and analysis of the 
JSF program in Turkey using the conceptual models. The data collection for this study is 
limited to public sources such as government reports, official websites of organizations 
discussed, journal articles, and unofficial translations of these sources by the author of 
this report. 
F. ORGANIZATION OF STUDY 
Chapter I, “Introduction,” provides a brief background on the basis of this 
research, the purpose of the study, the research questions to be addressed, the scope of the 
project and the methodology to be followed. 
Chapter II, “The Path to The Joint Strike Fighter: A Brief History of Turkish 
Aviation,” delivers a background on the history of Turkish aviation from its foundation, 
during World War II, and after NATO membership.  
Chapter III, “History and Current Status of the JSF Program,” gives detailed 
information on how the JSF project was formed, the involved parties, and initial 
expectations from the program, as well as the current challenges the program faces. 
Chapter IV, “Conceptual Models of Graham T. Allison for Foreign Policy 
Analysis,” explains Graham T. Allison’s Rational Actor, Organizational Behavior, and 
Governmental Politics models in detail. 
Chapter V, “Analysis of the JSF Program from Turkey’s Point of View Using 
Conceptual Models,” includes a thorough analysis of Turkey’s involvement in the F-35 
program, based on Allison’s Rational Actor and Organizational Behavior models.  
Chapter VI, “Conclusion and Suggestions for Future Research,” provides a 
summary and potential areas of future research.  
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II. THE PATH TO THE JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER: A BRIEF 
HISTORY OF TURKISH AVIATION 
The future is in the sky. Nations who fail to protect their skies can never 
be sure of their tomorrows. 
—Mustafa Kemal Atatürk 
Founder of the Republic of Turkey 
 
A. FOUNDATION AND EARLY YEARS (1911–1940) 
Evliya Celebi, an explorer, wrote in his travelogue called the Seyahatname (Book 
of Travel), that the roots of Turkish Aviation date back to the 1630s when legendary 
Ottoman aviator Hezârfen Ahmed Çelebi achieved sustained unpowered flight with eagle 
wings from the very top of the Galata Tower.  
The Turkish Air Force (TuAF) celebrated its 100th anniversary in June 2011. The 
first official Turkish aviation organization was founded in 1911 as the “Aviation 
Commission,” only eight years after the first flight of the Wright Brothers (Turkish Air 
Force, n.d.b). Turkish aviators, one of the pioneer groups in military aviation, participated 
in The Balkan War (1913), World War I (1914–1918), and the Turkish War of 
Independence (1919–1922) (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
After modern Turkey was established on October 29, 1923, Mustafa Kemal 
Atatürk, founding father of the Republic of Turkey, initiated modernization programs and 
reforms in all aspects of life: agriculture, education, industry, economy, politics, 
legislation, health, transportation, and more. Atatürk had a special interest for aviation. 
His foresight and vision were not limited to national security, and his use of the term 
“sky” was not limited to Stratosphere: 
No doubt, aircrafts are both the most effective weapon and means of the 
future. One day, humankind will walk in the skies without aircrafts, go to 
planets and, maybe, send us news from the moon. Waiting for the year 
2000 will not be necessary for this miracle to become real. (Türk Hava 
Kurumu Tüzüğü [Turkish Aeronautical Association Statute], 2004) 
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Advancement in aviation rapidly became a representation of power and 
development in Turkey. By 1935, ordinary Turkish citizens had raised funds for 
approximately 250 military aircraft through the Turkish Aircraft Association 
(Ozdemir, 2009).  
The young Turkish Republic, seeking investors, and German Junkers Company, 
seeking a way to manufacture aircraft around the limitations of the Treaty of Versailles, 
founded an aircraft plant (Turkish Aircraft, Automobile and Engine Ltd.) in Kayseri in 
1925. Unfortunately, this effort resulted in failure. However, in the 1930s, the Kayseri 
plant continued to be used as the location to assemble the aircraft that were purchased 
from the United States, the U.K., Germany, and Poland (Ozdemir, 2009). 
On the other side, there were individual domestic attempts to design and produce 
aircraft as well. Out of those, the efforts of Vecihi Hürkuş, a veteran fighter pilot, and 
Nuri Demirağ, an aviation enthusiast and businessman, are the most renowned ones. Still 
to this date, Hürkuş (free bird) is recalled as the name of the first Turkish aircraft and the 
person who built the first Turkish aircraft (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
B. WORLD WAR II (1940–1950) 
Between the two World Wars, Turkey chose not to be dependent on a single 
source for aircraft. For instance, Turkish government purchased bombers and trainers 
from the United States, the U.K. and Germany, while Poland provided the fighters. This 
trend changed right before World War II. In 1939, a treaty of alliance was signed 
between Turkey, France, and the U.K., a month after Germany attacked Poland. The 
treaty mandated military assistance to Turkey from France and the U.K., including 
military aircraft. Turkish air service started to improve with British guidance using U.S. 
lend-lease aircraft. Turkish officers were also sent over to the U.K. for further flight 
training. 
The Turkish Air League constructed another plant in Etimesgut, Ankara, with the 
purpose of assembling Miles Magister trainers and British Gypsy engines. The end 
product of the plant was a derivative of the Miles Magister and had clipped wings, 
uprated engine, and an enclosed cockpit. The aircraft was named MKEK-4 Uğur, and 60 
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of them were produced in 1954 to meet the basic training requirements of the TuAF. 
Until the 1980s, the Uğur was the last aircraft to be assembled in Turkey (Güvenç & 
Yanık, 2012).  
Turkey started to receive military assistance from the United States under the 
Truman Doctrine, two years after World War II. This assistance is largely believed to 
have helped Turkey form and improve an air force separate from the army, before the 
Cold War. The United States Air Force Group (TUSAFG), an advisory board to 
modernize the Turkish Air Force, not only introduced U.S. Air Force (USAF) equipment, 
construction and training to TuAF, but also suggested an organizational structure similar 
to the U.S. DOD. In May 1949, the Turkish Parliament passed a law to reform the 
Turkish defense department based on the U.S. model (Livingston, 1994).  
The U.S. military aid provided a tremendous improvement for the TuAF aircraft 
inventory. On the other side, the fledgling Turkish aviation industry became redundant 
with their moderate production capacity and somewhat advanced aircraft design and did 
not stand a chance against high-numbered low-priced military aid aircraft (Güvenç & 
Yanık, 2012). 
C. NATO MEMBERSHIP AND BEYOND 
In spite of initial hesitancy from countries outside of the North Atlantic region, on 
February 15, 1952, Turkey was officially accepted into the North Atlantic Treaty 
Organization (NATO). Turkey’s persistent diplomacy, geopolitical location as an 
“unsinkable aircraft carrier,” and excellent performance in Korea played a critical role in 
the process (Livingston, 1994). Soon after that, in October 1953, TuAF was appointed by 
the Brussels headquarters to the command of the Sixth Allied Tactical Air Force located 
in Izmir (Livingston, 1994). 
With the delivery of F-84G Thunderjets in 1952, not only the transition of Turkish 
Air Force to jet aircraft, but also the reign of the US Air Force jet combat aircraft began. 
The TuAF entirely operated aircraft that were designed and produced for the USAF. The 
average lag time between an aircraft’s entering U.S. service and TuAF’s procurement of 
that aircraft (see Table 1) was reported as 6.9 years (Karaağaç, 2010). 
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Table 1.   Jet Aircraft Operated by Turkish Air Force and Their Start Service 
Dates. Adapted from Karaağaç (2010). 





1 F-84G Thunderjet 1947 1952 5 F-86 Sabre 1949 1954 5 
2 
F-100 Super Sabre 1954 1958 4 
F-102 Delta Dagger 1956 1968 12 
F-104 Starfighter 1958 1963 5 
3 F-4 Phantom 1960 1974 14 F-5 Freedom Fighter 1962 1965 3 
4 F-16 Fighting Falcon 1980 1987 7 
 
TuAF refrained from operating non-USAF aircraft, especially due to the logistics 
system. For example, in 1961 Turkey refused to acquire Italian-built G-91R lightweight 
strike aircraft, simply because they did not want to interfere with the current logistics 
system. On the other hand, Turkey did not want to accept all USAF-operated aircraft 
either. TuAF rather preferred multi-role fighter-bomber type aircraft; thus, in 1961 they 
refused to acquire USAF-operated mission specialized combat aircraft such as 
interceptors like the F-86E and F102A. As an example of a combination of both, in 1984, 
Turkey turned down 40 British Tornado aircraft, since the aircraft were non-USAF and 
were designed to interdict and strike only (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
Receiving aircraft from a single source had its advantages in terms of continuity 
and standardization; however, this also led to a clear disadvantage in terms of serious 
military and diplomatic dependence. In early the 1970s, the results of this U.S. 
dependence started to surface (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). Especially during the détente 
(between 1967 and 1979), Turkey came to realize the importance of military 
independence when issues with Cyprus presented themselves (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
To regain independence, a quick fix was to diversify in terms of aircraft suppliers. 
A more radical solution was to start a national aircraft industry. Due to limitations in 
budget, the decision makers needed to reuse a model that had been successfully executed 
during the interwar years. In order to raise money for a national aircraft industry, Hava 
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Kuvvetlerini Güçlendirme Vakfı (Foundation for Strengthening the Air Force) was 
founded in 1970. Individuals and institutions were asked to contribute financially. With 
the motto ‘build your own aircraft,’ the foundation aimed to stimulate enthusiasm and air-
nationalism. By 1973, the foundation was able to gather enough funds to establish Türk 
Uçak Sanayi Anonim Şirketi (TUSAŞ). 
When Turkey conducted a military intervention in Cyprus in July 1974, the 
importance of the air forces was realized once again. However, this move led to a U.S. 
embargo on arms to Turkey. The embargo got the U.S. Congress involved in U.S. arms 
transfer decisions. As a result, the Congress has remained a participant in future decisions 
regarding arms deals between Turkey and the United States. 
During the embargo, TUSAŞ awarded a contract to the Italian company 
Aermacchi, to build MB 339 Trainer/Close Air Support Aircraft in 1977. The following 
year, the embargo was lifted, and the United States immediately tried to supply T-38A 
Talon advanced trainers, causing the MB 339 contract to be annulled (Güvenç & Yanık, 
2012). 
The Turkish government decided to produce 270 (then 160) combat aircraft in 
Turkey and was looking for partners to perform that production. General Dynamics and 
McDonnell Douglas, both from the United States, offered to co-produce the F-16 
Fighting Falcon (USAF-operated) and the F/A-18 Hornet (Naval aircraft), respectively. 
In 1983, Turkey decided to go forward with the single-engine F-16C/D aircraft, which 
cost significantly less than the twin-engine Hornet. Later on, the F-16 aircraft improved 
TuAF’s operational capabilities, satisfying Turkey’s power requirements, proving it was 
the right decision to opt for a multi-role combat aircraft (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
In 1984, Turkish Aerospace Industries (TAI) was established as a joint venture 
between TUSAŞ, holding 51 percent of the shares, and General Dynamics, which was 
later acquired by Lockheed Martin Corporation (Turkish Aerospace Industries, n.d.c). In 
2005, Turkish shareholders purchased “foreign shares” (remaining 49 percent) belonging 
to Lockheed Martin’s shares and General Electric (GE) (Turkish Aerospace 
Industries, n.d.c). TAI assembled almost all the F-16s ordered by TuAF. Another joint 
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venture, Turkish Engine Industries (TEI), between TUSAS and GE was established to 
produce F-110GE turbofan engines for the Turkish F-16s (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
Between 1987 and 2012, TAI assembled and delivered a total number of 308 F-16s 
(Turkish Aerospace Industries, 2012). To date, TAI and TEI are still leaders of Turkish 
aviation industry. 
D. TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE JSF PROGRAM 
In 1999, in order to replace TuAF’s aging F-4 and F-16 fleets with a next 
generation fighter, Turkey joined the JSF program’s Concept Demonstration Phase 
(CDP) as a Foreign Military Sales (FMS) Major Participant. In 2002, Turkey signed the 
international Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) for the System Development and 
Demonstration (SDD) Phase as a level III partner. On December 12, 2006, the Turkish 
Defence Industry Executive Committee (DIEC) selected the JSF as the future combat 
aircraft of TuAF and signed the MOU for the Production, Sustainment, and Follow-on 
Development (PSFD) Phase on January 25, 2007 (Undersecretariat for Defence 
Industries, 2016).  
As of August 2016, Turkey plans to buy 100 F-35As and ordered six F-35As (two 
in Low Rate Initial Production (LRIP)-10 and four in LRIP-11) (Undersecretariat for 
Defence Industries, 2016). 
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III. HISTORY AND CURRENT STATUS OF THE JSF 
PROGRAM 
A. FORMATION OF THE JSF PROGRAM 
In the aftermath of the dissolution of Soviet Union, in 1993, the U.S. DOD, under 
the Clinton Administration, conducted an inclusive review, called the bottom-up review 
(BUP), to refine the nation’s defense strategy, modernization plans, and force structure. 
One of the important decisions in the BUP was to terminate the A/F-X (a replacement 
program for carrier-based A-6 attack aircraft of the Navy) and Multi-Role Fighter (MRF) 
(a replacement program for F-16s) programs.   
1. Joint Advanced Strike Technology Program 
The second key decision of the review was to launch the Joint Advanced Strike 
Technology (JAST) program as a substitute for the terminated programs in order to 
develop several prototype aircraft to discover new technologies for common use with 
future aircraft. The purpose of the program was to reduce the development and 
production costs by developing a joint design whose components would be shared by 
future aircraft up to 80 percent in terms of cost (U.S. Department of Defense, 1993). 
In January 1994, following the program office establishment, the JAST program 
started conceptual design studies to determine a technology development program with 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, Pratt and Whitney, and McDonnell Douglas. The studies did 
not aim to perform flight demonstration of a certain aircraft design. Afterwards, the 
program narrowed its focus to developing an aircraft family that would replace some of 
the aging U.K. and U.S. aircraft (Bolkcom, 2003). 
In 1995, another program was included in the JAST program as a result of a 
congressional direction. This new program aimed to develop an advanced short takeoff 
and vertical landing (ASTOVL) aircraft and was directed by the Defense Advanced 
Research Projects Agency (DARPA). The new aircraft attracted attention and enabled the 
participation of the USMC and U.K., both of whom were already interested in obtaining 
new short takeoff and vertical landing aircrafts (STOVL) to replace their aging Harrier 
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STOVL aircraft. Following the addition of the USMC and the U.K., the program name 
JAST became Joint Strike Fighter, or JSF. The program also became more concentrated 
on developing and producing next-generation attack aircraft in a united, collaborative 
manner (Bolkcom, 2003). 
2. The Joint Strike Fighter Program 
Lockheed Martin, Boeing, and McDonnell Douglas (together with British 
Aerospace and Northrop Grumman) presented three different designs for the airframe. 
The DOD decided and announced on November 16, 1996, that Lockheed Martin and 
Boeing would compete in the Concept Demonstration phase of the program. 
Additionally, Pratt and Whitney was given the task of delivering support for propulsion 
hardware and engineering. Following that, contracts were awarded to both Lockheed 
Martin and Boeing for building and testing two prototypes (Gertler, 2014). 
It was very important for DOD to carefully scrutinize the designs of both 
Lockheed Martin and Boeing, as their final decision was anticipated to affect the coming 
years of U.S. military aviation as well as the U.S. combat aircraft industrial base. After 
all, the JSF program was expected to be the final fighter aircraft program to be conducted 
by DOD for a considerably long time, regarding the program’s size and foreseen outcome 
(Gertler, 2014). 
In March 2000, a Joint Operational Requirements Document was released, and in 
October 2001, the document was revalidated by DOD’s Joint Requirements Oversight 
Council. The Defense Acquisition Board conducted a Milestone B review on October 24, 
2001, which would permit the program to continue with the SDD phase. The next day, 
the Secretary of Defense reported to Congress that the program had completed the 
Concept Development Phase exit criteria and could move on to the SDD phase (Gertler, 
2014).  
Lockheed Martin and Pratt and Whitney were awarded SDD contracts on October 
26, 2001. In addition, General Electric stayed responsible for technical support regarding 
the development of an alternate engine to compete at the production phase 
(Gertler, 2014).  
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3. F-35 Lightning II 
The design that won the SDD contract was the X-35, and the F-35 Lightning II 
(see Figure 1) was derived from that design.   
 
Figure 1.  F-35 Lightning II Logo. Source: SF Program Office (n.d.a). 
As a tribute to Lockheed's World War II-era twin-propeller Lockheed P-38 
Lightning (United States Army Air Forces) and the Cold War-era jet English Electric 
Lightning (Royal Air Force), on July 7, 2006, USAF, as the main customer, declared that 
the aircraft would be named “F-35: Lightning II” (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 2014). 
To meet requirements, the F-35 is designed to have three variants which are quite 
similar, yet different: F-35A, F-35B, and F-35C. In April 2003, a Preliminary Design 
Review (PDR) was performed on the F-35 program. Critical Design Reviews for the F-
35A and F-35B took place in February 2006, and another one in June 2007 for the F-35C. 
Further details about the aircraft and its variants are given in the next section. 
B. INTERNATIONAL PARTICIPATION IN JSF PROGRAM 
The JSF program is an international acquisition program to which participating 
nations are expected to contribute financially and technologically. The program also aims 
to bring governments together on an advanced coalition platform in terms of military 
services. Therefore, the F-35 aircraft not only provides novel technologies to the partners’ 
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air forces but also makes international cooperation possible (U.S. Department of 
Defense, 2003). 
In terms of cooperation, the program does not merely bring the ally governments 
together, it also allows prime contractors and industrial partners to get involved. The 
MOU framework set up a structure for the relationship of the participating governments, 
defining the role of each partner, as well as their responsibilities and what they should 
expect as an outcome of the program. In addition, the relationship between the prime 
contractor and the subcontractors was established by certain licenses and agreements 
(U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2003). 
In accordance with the financial contribution of each country, the program’s 
international participation has been divided into three levels. For instance, being a level 1 
partner meant 10 percent financial contribution to develop the aircraft. In return, the 
partner is provided fully-involved staff in office as well as a director-level national 
deputy. The more money the country paid meant the more that country would be 
involved in the decisions on the requirements and the design of the aircraft, and would 
have broader access to the developing technologies (O’Rourke, 2009a). 
1. Concept Demonstration Phase  
The JSF program differed from most DOD acquisition programs by having 
noteworthy foreign involvement at early stages of the design phase. It was favorable to 
have foreign governments and industries as participants in order to boost equipment 
interoperability among ally nations as well as to have access to technologies of the allies. 
In return, this arrangement allowed the United States to share its capabilities with allies, 
as well as to divide financial aspects of the program and to support foreign acquisition of 
the aircraft. 




(1) Full Collaborative Partner 
During the CDP, the program’s sole collaborative partner was Britain. In 1995, 
Royal Navy became a participant of the program with an MOU. Then in 1999, the Royal 
Air Force was added to the memorandum. The U.K. was not only providing $200 million 
to the CDP but also playing an active role in determining of program requirements 
(Birkler et al., 2001). The MOU aimed to boost the coordination between U.S. services’ 
and U.K. systems’ requirements. In addition, on a number of integrated product teams, 
U.K. personnel were also included. A National Deputy at the director level was not the 
only position held by the U.K., but towards the end of the CDP, the U.K. had eight 
country representatives at the Program Office (Birkler et al., 2001). 
(2) Associate Partner 
The three countries that are at the associate partner level are the Netherlands, 
Norway, and Denmark. Within the year of 1997, each of these countries signed 
previously negotiated agreements. Their financial contribution was $10 million each, 
making $30 million in total, which was equal to U.S. contribution, bringing the total to 
$60 million. The associate partners aimed to be effective in requirements process of 
CTOL variant. Regarding both the MOU and the Memorandum of Agreement (MOA), 
the associate partners had the opportunity to have a say in the requirements development 
as long as the United States agreed that the outcomes would be beneficial for both parties. 
In the CDP, the associate partners each had one national deputy and one technical 
representative (Birkler et al., 2001). 
(3) Informed Partner 
The informed partners of the project were Italy and Canada. An MOU was signed 
between the United States and Canada in January 1998 and an MOA was signed between 
the United States and Italy in December 1998. Unlike full collaborative and associate 
partners, the informed partners were not provided with the authority to influence the 
requirements. The Italian Navy and Italian Air Force were involved in several tasks 
regarding the STOVL and the CTOL variants of the aircraft, respectively. On the other 
hand, Canada was involved in design improvements of the CTOL variant, in addition to 
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some other related tasks. Both countries provided $10 million each, and the United States 
contributed $50 million to the joint U.S.-Canadian activities (Birkler et al., 2001). 
(4) Foreign Military Sales Major Participant 
In 1999, Turkey, Singapore and Israel signed Letters of Offer and Acceptance and 
became FMS major participants (Birkler et al., 2001). These participants were included in 
the basic aspects of the JSF program, and were provided with access to unclassified and 
nonproprietary information regarding the designs and the requirements. Turkey 
contributed $6.2 million, whereas Singapore provided $3.6 million, and Israel contributed 
$0.75 million (Birkler et al., 2001). Unlike for the previous participant efforts, the United 
States is not financially contributing to joint FMS major participant efforts. 
Table 2 summarizes participant countries and their contributions to the program in 
the CDP. 
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Table 2.   International Participation in JSF CDP. Source: Birkler et al. (2001). 
 
 
2. System Development and Demonstration Phase  
Between 2001 and 2002, the U.K., Italy, Netherlands, Turkey, Australia, Norway, 
Denmark, and Canada joined the SDD phase. Based on the amount they financially 
contributed, the foreign participant nations were assigned to one of three levels during the 
SDD phase. Each participant receives benefits in proportion to their financial 
contributions (Table 3) (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). Additionally, their level also defines 
the number of representatives they have in the program office, the degree to which they 
have access to data and technological information, and whether or not they are members 
of management decision-making bodies (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006). 
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The JSF program does not promise the domestic or foreign suppliers a certain 
level of work in line with the participants’ financial contribution, which is what usually 
was observed in other international cooperative projects. The JSF program lets the 
suppliers bid for the work, which is a system termed as the “best value” by the DOD and 
the program office (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2006). 
Partnership levels in the SDD phase are as follows (and summarized by country in 
Table 3): 
(1) Level I 
The only Level I country in the SDD phase is the U.K. with its $2 billion 
contribution. On January 17, 2001, the United States and the U.K. agreed on the U.K.’s 
involvement in the SDD phase, which made up 8 percent of the whole SDD phase 
(Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). Although the prime contractor had yet to be determined, 
proponents called the U.K.’s involvement a “strong international affirmation of the JSF 
concept.” Numerous U.K. firms are participating in the program including Rolls-Royce 
and British Aerospace (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). 
(2) Level II 
Level II countries are Italy and the Netherlands. While Italy is contributing $1 
billion, the Netherlands is contributing $800 million to the program at this phase 
(Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). Italy’s main reason to join the program was to replace its 
leased U.S. F-16 aircraft and complement their Eurofighter Typhoons. They became a 
senior Level II partner of the program and now hold five positions in the Joint Program 
Office. Italy wanted its own final assembly line as well as a maintenance and upgrade 
facility. On the other hand, the Netherlands was integrated into the program on June 17, 
2002, following an evaluation of the potential alternatives on their side for a period of 30 
months. The Netherlands has aimed to enhance its position as a center of overhaul, 
maintenance, and repair in Europe (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). 
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(3) Level III 
The rest of the participating nations, Canada, Norway, Denmark, Australia, and 
Turkey, became Level III partners of the program with financial contributions ranging 
between $100 and $175 million (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). Although in terms of money 
Level III partners’ contributions are significantly less than the Level I and II partners, the 
United States is committed to provide all the partners with the aircraft once produced. 
Turkey’s involvement in the program was considered as a good opportunity for Turkish 
defense industry by Turkish officials (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). 





3. Production, Sustainment, and Follow-On Development Phase 
Unlike the SDD phase, the PSFD phase does not name any partner levels. The 
PSFD MOU includes the reasons why the participants are interested in purchasing the 
new aircraft, which variant, in what quantity, and the delivery schedule. The program 
structure is expanded to involve the partners in the decision of follow-on development. 
This phase’s costs are divided among the participants in proportion to each partner’s 
planned purchase amount (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007).  
In addition, the PSFD is an agreement that includes all participating nations and is 
not bilateral like the SDD MOUs. According to the program executives, it was harder to 
reach an agreement among all participants, due to the expectancy of “offset” 
arrangements in the PSFD agreement. In the case of defense contracts involving foreign 
partners, offset arrangements are viewed as standard. These arrangements are generally 
supported by certain actions in order to balance the agreement’s effect on the purchasing 
nation’s local workforce. For the JSF program, however, the executives wanted to avoid 
offsets and encourage competition instead. Therefore, all participating nations agreed to a 
competitive work environment and to follow a “best-value” basis for the PSFD MOU 
(Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). 
4. Primary Reasons and Concerns of Partner Countries to Participate in 
the JSF Program 
According to a U.S. DOD study (U.S. Department of Defense, 2003), participant 
countries had two primary motives for participating in the JSF program: operational 
requirement and industrial benefit. Table 4 summarizes the primary motives, government 
approaches, and concerns of participant countries in the SDD phase. 
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Table 4.   Summary of Country Strategies and Concerns. 






C. SPECIFICATIONS OF F-35 JOINT STRIKE FIGHTER 
In this section, description of the participant’s requirements, three variants of F-35 
and common technological characteristics of the JSF are specified. 
1. Description of the Requirement 
According to JSF Program Office (n.d.c), the participants of the JSF program 
have different necessities that the aircraft to be produced is expected to satisfy. For 
instance, the USN requires a first day of war, survivable strike fighter aircraft, whereas 
the USAF is in need of a multirole aircraft (Primary-air-to-ground). On the other hand, 
the USMC and the U.K. are looking for a STOVL aircraft and other nations demand a 
CTOL aircraft (JSF Program Office, n.d.c).  
2. Variants of F-35 
Although the general design of the F-35, produced by Lockheed Martin with its 
partners Northrop Grumman and BAE systems, is similar to a scaled-down F-22, the 
variants of the F-35 aircraft are developed in order to fulfill the individual needs of the 
participants: The F-35A is designed for the USAF; the F-35B is for the USMC and the 
U.K.; and the F-35C is for the USN. Despite having nuances (see Figure 2), the variants 
are united in terms of airframe, avionics components, and engine specifications in order 
to keep the costs of development, production, operation, and support at a moderate level 
(JSF Program Office, n.d.c). 
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Figure 2.  Three Variants of F-35. Source: Defense Industry Daily (2015). 
a. F-35A Conventional Takeoff and Landing  
The F-35A is built for the U.S. Air Force and participant allies making it the most 
prevalent variant of the F-35 Lightning II (Figure 3). Having the capability of 
conventional takeoff and landing, the F-35A is most suitable for traditional bases and 
regular runways; thus, it is the primary export variant for the allied nations, including 
Turkey. It is an agile, high-performance, 9g capable stealth multirole fighter that takes 
advantage of sensor fusion and unprecedented situational awareness. Only the F-35A 
variant has an internal cannon. It utilizes the flying boom method for air-to-air refueling 
(Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.a). 
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Figure 3.  F-35A Conventional Takeoff and Landing (CTOL). Source: JSF 
Program Office (n.d.b). 
b. F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing  
The F-35B aircraft is unique in terms of combining stealth, STOVL capability, 
and supersonic speed, meaning that this certain aircraft is capable of operating from roads 
and austere bases, as well as small, air-capable ships near front-line combat zones, in 
addition to longer runways on major bases where it can conventionally takeoff and land 
(see Figure 4). Moreover, the ability to deploy close to front-line combat zones allows 
shortening the distance from base to target, hence reducing the logistics support 
requirements and increasing sortie frequencies (Ozdemir, 2009). 
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Figure 4.  F-35B Short Takeoff/Vertical Landing (STOVL). Source: 
JSF Program Office (n.d.b). 
A shaft-driven propulsion system (LiftFan by Rolls-Royce) and an engine, 
capable of rotating 90 degrees, enabled F-35B to perform the STOVL function. With 
respect to F-35A, the F-35B has a smaller internal weapon bay and a smaller internal fuel 
capacity due to the LiftFan. Finally, the variant uses the probe and drogue method for 
aerial refueling, instead of the F-35A’s boom method (Lockheed Martin Corporation, 
n.d.b). 
On July 31, 2015, it was announced that 10 F-35Bs were ready for deployment, 
which meant the USMC’s aircraft had achieved initial operational capability (U.S. 
Department of Defense, 2015).  
The USMC and the U.K. received their F-35B aircraft. The aircraft are placed at 
Marine Corps Air Station at Yuma, Arizona, which is the first operational F-35B base, 
and the Marine Corps Air Station at Beaufort, South Carolina, in which the trainings for 
the aircraft will be carried out. For the operational testing of the first F-35Bs of the U.K. 
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are at RAF 17 Squadron in Edwards Air Force Base (AFB), California. The F-35B will 
be used by the Italian Air Force as well (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.b). 
c. The F-35C Carrier Variant  
The F-35C carrier variant is the USN’s first stealth aircraft (see Figure 5). The 
variant is capable of catapult launching from large carriers and fly-in arrestments. The 
pilot will be able to operate the aircraft precisely at carrier approaches thanks to the larger 
wings and control surfaces. The variant also has added wingtip ailerons that can fold; 
thus, the aircraft occupies less space on the carrier’s deck. Moreover, the aircraft is able 
to endure the launches and recoveries from the carrier due to the larger and more robust 
landing gear and stronger internal structure. Additionally, to reduce the need for 
maintenance to protect the very low observable radar signature of the aircraft, ruggedized 
materials are used for the exterior (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.c). 
 
Figure 5.  F-35C Carrier Variant. Source: JSF Program Office (n.d.b). 
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Among all three variants, the F-35C has the largest internal fuel capacity at 
approximately 20,000 lbs. The greater capacity allows the aircraft to loiter longer at 
greater range than the other F-35 variants, which makes it possible for the Navy to 
control the aircraft from a distance without interference. The F-35C uses the probe and 
drogue method for refueling like the F-35B variant (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.c). 
3. Technological Characteristics of F-35 
Common key technological characteristics among all variants are the following: 
(1) Electronic Attack 
F-35 pilots will be able to detect and follow the enemy, disrupt attacks, and jam 
radars very efficiently due to advanced electronic warfare features of the aircraft. In 
addition, the pilots will always be one step ahead by having real-time access to battle 
space information with 360-degree coverage thanks to advanced avionics (Lockheed 
Martin Corporation, n.d.d). The sensors on the aircraft will be able to gather data and 
instantly share them with the commanders. The pilots will be able to suppress enemy 
radars and engage highly-defended targets (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d).   
(2) Air-to-Surface 
The F-35 aircraft is capable of evading radars, which fourth-generation aircraft 
cannot, thanks to its very low-observable stealth. According to Lockheed Martin 
Corporation (n.d.d), together with active electronically-scanned array (AESA) radar 
technology and “clean configuration,” the ability to carry internal weapon loads, and fuel 
tank, the F-35 can last longer in action, avoiding being detected. To fulfill an air-to-
ground mission, the aircraft can use air-to-air radar-guided missiles and precision-guided 
munitions. With this type of structure and advanced technological features, the aircraft 
will have a clear advantage against its opponents (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d). 
(3) Air-to-Air 
In addition to its information systems and integrated sensors, F-35 has a smaller 
radar cross-section compared to fourth-generation and legacy aircraft, which provides 
significant advantage to detect foes first and take lethal action from a greater distance 
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without being detected. It is an ability that will change air-to-air tactics of the previous 
generation completely (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d). 
(4) Intelligence, Surveillance, and Reconnaissance  
The processor speed of 400 billion operations per second of its core processor, 
combined with stealth and integrated sensors, allows the F-35 to gather and process an 
unprecedented amount of data and share this real-time data securely with all commanders 
in the battlefield. To carry out intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance missions, the 
F-35 has an electronic warfare suit and Electro-Optical Targeting System (EOTS) 
consisting of eight sensors, which provide 360-degree coverage to identify electronic 
emissions and enemy radars (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d).  
(5) Unparalleled Stealth 
Enemy radars virtually cannot detect the F-35 due to its unprecedented stealth 
capability provided by its advanced materials, axisymmetric nozzle and integrated 
airframe design, and extensive countermeasures (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d). 
(6) Interoperability 
The F-35 raises situational awareness of the entire network of operation centers 
and legacy aircraft by sharing all data gathered from the battlefield information 
(Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d). Modern tactical datalinks, beyond line-of-sight 
communications, and web-enabled logistics support will provide the F-35 a high level of 
interoperability among the coalition forces (Ozdemir, 2009). 
(7) Full Mission Systems Coverage  
Avionics, communication systems, displays, and integrated electronic sensors are 
together known as mission systems. The mission systems are responsible for gathering 
and sharing data with the pilot and friendly aircraft at sea/on the ground. The F-35 
aircraft is equipped with the most advanced versions of these components related to 
communication, such as the AESA radar, helmet mounted display, distributed aperture 
system, EOTS targeting system, and the communications, navigation, and identification 
avionics (Lockheed Martin Corporation, n.d.d). 
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D. COST AND SCHEDULE OVERRUNS 
In October 2001, the Defense Acquisition Board (DAB) approved Milestone B, 
and the SDD contract was awarded to Lockheed Martin. Regarding the Milestone B 
decision of the DAB, the Cost Analysis Improvement Group made an independent cost 
estimate and evaluated the program as highly risky considering both the schedule and 
performance aspects. They found the schedule, driven by the urgent need to replace aging 
aircraft, too ambitious with the intention of having the first flight in 2005 and producing 
600 aircraft by the end of the initial operational test and evaluation in March 2012. The 
concurrency of this schedule was 25 percent, whereas it was 18 percent for the F-22 
program, which was similarly demanding resources (Blickstein et al., 2011). 
DOD initiated the program in October 2001 anyway, which at the time had 
noteworthy scheduling issues in terms of development and production. In 2004, when 
problems regarding performance started to surface, the program was reviewed and 
rearranged. Then, in 2007, the baseline was reformed once again because of the 
increasing cost and scheduling slips. The whole program was restructured due to 
continuing issues by the Secretary of Defense in February 2010 (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2012). The growth occurred in two big jumps that can be observed 
in Figure 6.  
When the Program Acquisition Unit Cost (PAUC) and Average Procurement Unit 
Cost (APUC) were evaluated in December 2010, for baselines for the year 2001 and 
2007, a serious Nunn-McCurdy breach was observed due to cost and schedule issues. At 
the end of 2010, the breach for the PAUC was 78.23 percent and 80.66 percent for the 
APUC with respect to the 2001 baseline, and was 27.34 percent for the PAUC and 31.23 




Figure 6.  F-35 Acquisition Funding. Source: Blickstein et al. (2011). 
In March 2012, DOD implemented a new acquisition program baseline, which 
was a decision that was made two years after Congress was informed about the critical 
Nunn-McCurdy breach and cost/schedule issues and the need to determine a new 
milestone approval and new baseline. The new baseline foresaw the total acquisition cost 
as $395.7 billion, which was of $117.2 billion more than 2007 baseline, including $335.7 
billion in procurement funding, an increase of $104 billion from the 2007 baseline (see 
Figure 7) (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012). 
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Figure 7.  JSF Program Cost and Quantity Estimates over Time. Source: 
U.S. Government Accountability Office (2012). 
With the new baseline, the quantity of the total JSF procurement through fiscal 
year (FY) 2017 was cut by 410 aircraft. However, DOD expects to meet the 
predetermined procurement of 2,443 jets for the United States and anticipates for the 
costs to expand beyond FY 2017 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2012). The 
changes in procurement quantities can be seen in Figure 8. 
In June 2014, the whole F-35 fleet was banned from flying for a month after an F-
35A engine caught fire at takeoff. Flight restrictions were also issued for the following 
couple months. Pratt and Whitney conducted an investigation to determine the cause, and 
reported that the incident occurred due to excessive heating as a result of engine fan 
components rubbing onto each other and causing the engine parts to be released at high 
speed. As the fleet was grounded and then the flights were restricted for a certain period 
of time, none of the preplanned flight tests were conducted. However, some tests that 
were scheduled to be done later were possible to accomplish instead; thus, the overall 
schedule was still manageable. Regarding the overheating problem, further investigations 
were carried out. The contractor detected 22 other engines with the same problem. A 
short-term solution was offered by the officials to resume flight test operations. Eighteen 
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of those 22 aircraft were fixed with this solution and were back to regular flight 
operations by January 31, 2015 (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015). 
 
Figure 8.  Changes in Procurement Plans over Time. Source: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2012). 
After readjusting the cost and schedule baselines in 2012, DOD made more 
changes every following year. The number of aircraft to be bought between 2015 and 
2017 was decreased by 37 by the DOD while the procurement timeline was extended 
another year. Then, in 2014, procurement of four more aircraft was postponed over the 
same timeline. DOD based its decisions mainly on budget constraints. It was expected 
that these changes would reduce concurrency and funding risks in the short run. 
Nevertheless, it is anticipated that the average unit cost per aircraft will increase as well 
as the funding liability (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2015). 
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E. CURRENT STATUS OF THE JSF PROGRAM 
In this section, the current status of the JSF program is explained in detail 
including figures for the cost, schedule and quantity as well as the current technical issues 
faced.  
1. Current Status by Numbers 
Although it seems that the estimated figures for the cost, schedule, and quantity 
had risen substantially between the 2001 and 2012 baselines of the program, the numbers 
were rather stable between 2012 and 2015 (see Table 5) (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2016a). Planned procurement numbers as of 2016 are shown in 
Table 6. 
Table 5.   Changes in Procurement Plans between 2001–2015. Source: U.S. 
Government Accountability Office (2016a). 
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“Since 2011, a total of 154 aircraft have been delivered to DOD and international 
partners, 45 of which were delivered in 2015” (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 
2016a). Figure 9 illustrates the aircraft delivered and in production. 
 
Figure 9.  Number of F-35 Joint Strike Fighter Aircraft Delivered and in 
Production as of December 2015. Source: U.S. Government 
Accountability Office (2016a). 
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DOD has divided its development, testing, and fielding activities into software 
blocks (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016a). Figure 10 shows these blocks, 
related capabilities brought by these blocks and the percentage of test points completed. 
 
Figure 10.  Subsequent Development and Flight Test Status of F-35 Joint Strike 
Fighter Mission Systems Software Blocks as of December 2015. 
Source: U.S. Government Accountability Office (2016b). 
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2. Current Technical Issues 
The JSF program still has performance issues yet to be resolved. Some of the 
most significant technical issues are as follows: 
(1) Engine Seal  
In order to fix the engine overheating problem that occurred in 2014, a design 
change was proposed and implemented by the officials. After investigations, the officials 
determined that 180 engines needed that fix, and 69 of those aircraft received the new 
parts by September 2015. Pratt and Whitney undertook the retrofitting costs as the engine 
contractor (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016a).    
(2) Ejection Seat 
The program officials detected another problem regarding the ejection seats, 
which was the possibility of neck injuries during ejection for pilots weighing less than 
136 lbs. The problem was caused by the rotation of the ejection seat together with the 
power of the parachute deployment. The issue was discovered while testing the helmet 
mounted display, yet it was not due to the helmet’s weight. To solve this problem, the 
officials are considering implementing a switch for the pilots to allow them to slow down 
the parachute deployment, decreasing the helmet weight, or retrofitting a head rest to 
minimize the head movement during ejection. The final fixes and the cost of the fix are 
yet to be determined (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016a). 
(3) Autonomic Logistics Information System (ALIS) 
ALIS has several ongoing issues that pose schedule and operational risks. For 
instance, it may not be deployable. The Marine Corps usually deploys to harsh locations. 
On the other hand, ALIS requires necessary infrastructure to power the system and server 
connectivity. Even though the version was updated in 2015, the comprehensive 
deployability tests have not been completed. Another issue is that ALIS does not have a 
backup system or redundancy for the central point of entry and main operating unit, 
which can cause the fleet to go offline if the system fails (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2016a). 
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(4) Wing Structure Cracks 
In 2015, after completion of almost 85 percent (13,700 hours) of the required 
hours of durability testing, officials noticed cracks in the wing structure of the structural 
testing aircraft of the F-35C variant. The testing process was put on hold until the test 
aircraft was fixed and strengthened using internal and external straps. Lockheed Martin 
officials said that a long-term fix for the issue has not been found. Nevertheless, officials 
do not expect this problem to have significant impacts since the issue occurred beyond 
the lifecycle of the aircraft (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016a). 
3. Summary 
The F-35 development program is approaching the finish line; however, there are 
still many developmental flight tests to be accomplished. Although the majority of the 
problems encountered so far have been either resolved or lessened, the program still 
possesses risk elements. Some ongoing issues, including the performance problems with 
ALIS, the ejection seat, and the wing structures of the F-35C variant, are yet to be 
resolved. In addition, cost, affordability, and oversight issues are still expected to be 
encountered. For instance, DOD already foresees that starting in 2022, more than $14 
billion each year will be needed for a decade in order to obtain aircraft. Considering its 
other programs, such as the C-46A tanker and the long-range strike bomber, competing 
for resources, it seems improbable for the DOD to keep up with the funding for the 
program over such a long period given that multiyear contracts already cover almost 30 
percent of DOD’s acquisition budget (U.S. Government Accountability Office, 2016a). 
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IV. CONCEPTUAL MODELS OF GRAHAM T. ALLISON FOR 
FOREIGN POLICY ANALYSIS 
Conceptual frameworks for understanding and explaining strategic decision 
making in organizations, especially military, and for foreign policy analysis have 
decades-long history. RAND Corporation was one of the first institutions that practiced 
interdisciplinary and organizational approach in studying nation’s actions and decisions 
(Augier & Guo, 2012).  
Andrew Marshall, a strategic thinker and a foreign policy strategist at RAND 
Corporation, starting in the 1960s, suggested that incorporating multiple studies on 
organizational behavior might bring a different perspective to strategic decision making. 
To further investigate organizational behavior in military organizations, Marshall brought 
together study groups including pioneers of the area such as Joe Bower, Richard 
Neustadt, Fred Ikle, Ernest May, Harry Rowen and Graham T. Allison, who was also the 
rapporteur (Augier & Guo, 2012).  
Allison’s involvement in these groups, in addition to his studies with Marshall, 
paved the way for his well-known book Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban 
Missile Crisis (1971). In the second edition, Allison, together with Philip Zelikow, 
broadened the scope of his book to include recent studies. They summarize their study in 
three propositions: 
1. Professional analysts of foreign affairs and policymakers as well as 
ordinary citizens think about problems of foreign and military policy in 
terms of largely implicit conceptual models that have significant 
consequences for the content of their thought. 
2. Most analysts explain and predict behavior of national governments in 
terms of one basic conceptual model here entitled Rational Actor Model. 
3. Two alternative conceptual models, here labeled an organizational 
behavior model and a governmental politics model provide a base for 
improved explanations and predictions. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) 
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A quick overview of the three models in their own words is included here: 
A central metaphor illuminates differences among these models. Foreign 
policy has often been compared to moves, sequences of moves, and games 
of chess. If one were limited to observations on a screen upon which 
moves in the chess game were projected without information as to how the 
pieces came to be moved, he would assume—as Model 1 does—that an 
individual chess player was moving the pieces with reference to plans and 
maneuvers toward the goal of winning the game. But a pattern of moves 
can be imagined that would lead the serious observer, after matching 
several games, to consider the hypothesis [Model 2] that the chess player 
was not a single individual but rather a loose alliance of semi-independent 
organizations, each of which moved its set of pieces according to standard 
operating procedures. For example, movement of separate sets of pieces 
might proceed in turn, each according to a routine, the king's rook, bishop, 
and their pawns repeatedly attacking the opponent according to a fixed 
plan. Furthermore, it is conceivable that the pattern of play [Model 3] 
would suggest to an observer that a number of distinct players, with 
distinct objectives but shared power over the pieces, were determining the 
moves as the resultant of collegial bargaining. For example, the black 
rook’s move might contribute to the loss of a black knight with no 
comparable gain for the black team, but with the black rook becoming the 
principal guardian of the ‘palace’ on that side of the board. (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 6) 
In this chapter, these three models and the “path dependence” concept (David, 
1994) are discussed briefly. 
A. THE RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL (MODEL I) 
The rational actor model (RAM) of Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) 
tries to elucidate international incidents and affairs by rechecking and evaluating the 
goals and calculations of governments or nations. Most foreign policy analysts and even 
citizens primarily apply this model in order to understand international events.  
When we talk about international events, we regard them as policies or decisions 
rather than coincidental happenings. The terms “decision” and “policy” assume a decider 
and a number of choices to achieve a “goal” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999).   
The assumption of goal-driven behavior is very prevalent in social sciences. For 
instance, in economics, a “rational” customer chooses the right number of products A, B, 
and C in order to maximize their utility. Similarly, a rational seller supplies the right 
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amount of a product at a point that maximizes his profit at which marginal revenue equals 
to marginal cost. In more uncertain areas, such as in game theory, decision makers try to 
maximize their expected utility. 
There are four core concepts of rational action (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
• Goals and Objectives: Payoff or utility or preferences are 
explained by a payoff function that ranks all possible consequences 
in terms of goals and objectives. 
• Alternatives: The rational decision maker chooses from among a 
set of sufficiently differentiated alternative courses of action. 
• Consequences: Each alternative has its own set of consequences 
and outcomes. 
• Choice: The rational choice is to select the best alternative that 
ranks highest in the payoff function. 
In this context, rationality means value-maximizing choice. Conscious rationality 
is the base assumption of “consumer theory” and “theory of the firm” in economics 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999). If an analyst knows these four aspects of a decision maker, 1) 
he can calculate the most reasonable course of action for the decision maker to achieve 
his objectives, and 2) he can assume that this action will actually be chosen since the 
decision maker is rational. 
This assumption of rationality may be as misleading as it is explanatory. In order 
to avoid misleading assumptions, an analyst should differentiate between “comprehensive 
rationality” and “bounded rationality” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). In comprehensive 
rationality, the actor has all the information about alternatives, assesses all consequences, 
and has a utility function that ranks all the alternatives to make the value-maximizing 
choice. The actor is assumed to have full knowledge and computational power. The 
actors who misperceive a situation are defined as irrational. On the other hand, in 
bounded rationality, the content of the objectives, limitations of the knowledge, and the 
computational power of the actor are recognized. The model takes into account the values 
and beliefs of the actor, the information, and the perception he has of the situation. 
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On the other axis of the spectrum lies the information about the agent. When the 
analyst has the least information, the actor is a notional state (i.e., state A). As the 
amount of information increases with more specification and context, the agent becomes 
a generic state classified by a regime type (i.e., democracy), or with further information, 
an identified state (i.e., the United States). The agent is at the personified state if the 
leader puts his personal opinions, thoughts, and values to the center. (i.e., the Kennedy 
administration) (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
The RAM is applied across the spectrum, which ranges from the least information 
(notional state) to the highest information (personified state) about the agent. This matrix 
is shown in Figure 11. 
 
Figure 11.  Application of the Rational Actor Model. Adapted from 
Allison & Zelikow (1999, p. 22). 
We can formulate the RAM by the “analytical paradigm” developed by Robert K. 
Merton for sociological analyses. Merton suggests that “a paradigm is a systematic 
statement of the basic assumptions, concepts, and propositions employed by a school of 
analyses” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 23). The components of the paradigm that was 
used in Allison and Zelikow’s (1999, p. 24) study are as follows: 
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1. Basic Unit of Analysis 
Governmental action as choice: International events are a result of national 
governments choosing the best option that will maximize their strategic goals and 
objectives. 
2. Organizing Concepts 
The organizing concepts that help to better understand the Rational Actor Model 
are briefly described in this section. 
a. Unified Rational Actor 
The government is the “agent” who is a rational, unitary decision maker. 
b. The Problem 
The agent acts in response to a strategic situation and arising threats and 
opportunities. 
c. Action as a Rational Choice 
(1) Objectives: National interests 
(2) Alternatives: Options available 
(3) Consequences: “Benefits and costs in terms of strategic goals and 
objectives” 
(4) Choice: Value maximizing alternative (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24) 
3. Dominant Inference Pattern 
To accomplish the objectives of the actor, a nation or its representative performs a 
certain action. This action must have been chosen as the “value maximizing means” 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 24). The model accepts the beliefs and values of the players 
regardless of their accuracy (bounded rationality) rather than classifying their action as 
irrational. The inference pattern provides the model its descriptive power. 
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4. General Prepositions 
(1) We can formulate the general principle as the likelihood of any particular 
action depending on: 
• The state’s relevant values and objectives 
• Perceived alternative courses of action 
• Estimates of consequences 
• Net valuation of each set of consequences (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, p. 25) 
(2) An increase (decrease) in the perceived costs of an alternative reduces 
(increases) the likelihood of that action being chosen (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, p. 25). 
5. Evidence 
Detailed behaviors, statements of government officials, and government papers 
provide a look through the government’s point of view. 
6. The Advantages and Disadvantages of RAM 
As Thomas C. Schelling noted, “A major advantage of the RAM is that you can 
sit in your armchair and try to predict how people will behave if you have your wits about 
you. You get, free of charge, a lot of vicarious, empirical behavior” (as cited in Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 49). 
The disadvantage of this comfort is depending on only logical inferences and not 
knowing anything about the actual objectives, estimates, and options of the actor. An 
imaginative analyst can unintentionally come up with implausible objectives that he 
thinks the actor must have had. If an analyst makes further assumptions about an actor’s 




B. THE ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL 
The organizational behavior model considers governmental actions as “outputs” 
of organizations that function according to a set of standard operating procedures, unlike 
the first model where actions were conscious “choices” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
Therefore, with this second model, the analyst can comprehend governmental actions 
better, since the government is not an individual per se but comprises lightly allied 
organizations. 
Allison (1999, p. 145) highlights five important aspects of an organization as 
follows: 
• An organization is composed of elements that have diverse roles 
contributing to achievement of the goal of the entire system. The 
term “organization” in this model, is a formal, permanent 
establishment rather than temporary gatherings of people.  
• The organization has a greater capacity than its members’ 
individual capacity, thanks to division of labor and specialization. 
• The organizations’ behavior is limited by current routines and 
programs, and they are more inclined towards continuing what 
they are doing at the moment. 
• Organizations’ formal and informal norms provide a frame for the 
organizational culture to make individuals’ behavior fit in.  
• The capacity of an organization is defined by the “hardware,” such 
as aircraft, pilots, whereas performance is determined by 
“software,” such as standard operating procedures, routines. 
The organizational behavior model is explained using the same components as 
defined in Allison and Zelikow’s book (1999, p. 164) as follows: 
1. Basic Unit of Analysis 
Governmental action as organizational output is characterized by the following: 
• Rather than the choices, the organizational outputs are the actual 
occurrences. 
• The range of effective choice consists of existing organizational 
capacities and physical assets. 
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• Organizational outputs shape the situation and leaders mostly make 
decisions within the narrow constraints of the situation. 
2. Organizing Concepts 
The organizing concepts that help to better understand the Organizational 
Behavior Model are briefly described in this section. 
a. Organizational Actors 
The actor is a collection of loosely allied organizations rather than a monolithic 
nation. 
b. Factored Problems and Fractionated Power 
These are “the two edges of the same sword” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 167). 
Large governmental organizations have a considerable amount of autonomy over 
processing information and performing a set of actions. However, the large size of these 
organizations also prevents a single authority within the organization from making all 
important decisions. 
c. Organizational Missions 
Organizations, as well as businesses, have a clear and concise statement that 
expresses and explains the organization to its customers and members. Organizations 
interpret those missions according to their own terms. 
d. Operational Objectives, Special Capacities, and Culture 
Organizational culture and external bodies, such as clients, government allies, and 
extra-national counterparts, limit the view of an organization and result in organizations 
developing stable propensities. According to Allison and Zelikow (1999, p. 167), 
organizational culture is highlighted by the following characteristics: 
• The way the organization has defined success in operational terms 
• Selective information available to the organization 
• Special systems or technologies operated by the organization 
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• Professional norms for recruitment and tenure of personnel 
• The experience of making “street-level” decisions 
• Distribution of rewards by the organization 
e. Action as an Organizational Output 
(1) Objectives: Compliance Defining Acceptable Performance 
Allison and Zelikow (1999) suggest that the operational objectives of an 
organization are derived from a set of targets and constraints, which represents a quasi-
resolution. The constraints are usually articulated by imperatives to avoid disasters and 
discomforts. 
(2) Sequential Attention to Objectives 
A different set of subunits, which are most concerned with the problem, deal with 
each problem. This sequential attention resolves the conflicts among operational targets 
and constraints. 
(3) Standard Operating Procedures (SOP) 
The standard rules about operation enable coordinated action by a large number of 
individuals. These rules are usually unambiguous and easy to learn. They do not change 
quickly or easily. The deeper the SOPs are grounded in the organization’s culture, the 
more resistant they are to change.  
(4) Programs and Repertoires 
A set of SOPs for producing specific actions comprise a program for handling a 
situation. Repertoires consist of programs related to a certain activity. These repertoires 
and programs become more important in determining the organizational behavior as the 
number of individuals included in the situation increases (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
(5) Uncertainty Avoidance 
Organizations tend to avoid uncertainty rather than to estimate the future 
possibilities. They try to maximize autonomy by a negotiated environment. 
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(6) Problem-directed Search 
An organization’s search for alternatives is problem oriented. It focuses on similar 
symptoms first, then the course of actions similar to the current alternative. 
(7) Organizational Learning and Change 
Learning and change usually happen within the world view of the organization’s 
culture. However, dramatic changes occur sometimes under these conditions (Allison & 
Zelikow, 1999, p. 171): 
• Budgetary Feast (i.e., Apollo Program budget during Cold War) 
• Prolonged Budgetary Famine (i.e., budget cuts in the U.S. DOD) 
• Dramatic Performance Failures (i.e., Challenger disaster) 
f. Central Coordination and Control 
The central coordination of foreign policy is necessary for the nation’s welfare 
(Allison & Zelikow, 1999). Constraints are basic instruments of central control. 
However, the specification of effective operational constraints is difficult, especially for 
the organization whose outputs cannot be easily quantifiable. Organizational culture also 
makes it difficult for political leaders to intervene quickly and easily in those 
organizations. 
g. Decisions of Government Leaders 
In the long run, leaders can make deliberate changes in organizations or even 
create a new one. They mostly rely on an organization’s existing programs, which 
includes information, estimates, and alternatives on a given issue. 
3. Dominant Inference Pattern 
“Assuming t is a specific point in time, the best explanation of an organization’s 
behavior at t is its behavior at t-1; the best prediction of what will happen at t+1 is its 
behavior at t ” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 175). 
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4. General Prepositions 
General propositions for the Organizational Behavior Model listed by Allison and 
Zelikow (1999) are explained in this section. 
a. Existing Organized Capabilities Influence Government Choice 
A special existing capacity of an organization, which has already been paid, is 
more likely to be chosen because it is a conceivable option and available at a lower cost 
than a hypothetical option. 
b. “Organizational Priorities Shape Organizational Implementation” 
Organizations are hesitant when it comes to stating the goals that are most in line 
with their own capabilities and conceptions of duty. If the organization’s goals are 
conflicting yet compatible with its culture and capacity, the choice is made regarding the 
incompatible constraints. The choice fulfils one of the conflicting goals and neglects the 
other. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999) 
c. Implementation Reflects Previously Established Routines 
Routines enable a large number of individuals within an organization to deal with 
standard situations successfully, without much thought, but not with specific, critical 
instances. Routines form SOPs, programs consist of complex set of programs, and 
repertoires comprises set of programs. 
d. “Leaders Neglect Calculations of Administrative Feasibility at their 
Peril” 
Allison and Zelikow (1999) assert that a considerable difference exists between 
the leaders’ choices and the organizations’ actual capability to implement those choices. 
Then there is another gap between what is chosen and what is actually implemented. 
e. Limited Flexibility and Incremental Change 
The behavior of an organization at time t, is slightly different than at t-1, therefore 
it is safe to predict that the behavior would also be similar at t+1. According to this 
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approach, organizations would take previous year’s budget into account and change 
budgets incrementally. With the same logic, organizational procedures and repertoires 
would change incrementally as well. Moreover, any new activity would be a marginally 
adapted version of existing activities and programs. While the budgets, procedures and 
activities would be changed slightly and incrementally; organizational culture, priorities, 
and perceptions are most likely to stay the same.  
An organization also demonstrates a consistent behavior. For instance, if a 
program is once initiated, it will not be terminated even when the estimated costs 
outweighs the benefits and negative outcomes are received. Instead, the organization 
would strengthen its commitment to the program even more by trying to rationalize 
including additional resources and not changing the course of action (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999).  
f. Long-range Planning 
Model I assumes that governments deal with an uncertain future by long-run plans 
devised by planning units. Model II, on the other hand, assumes the effective contribution 
of those planning units to the organizational output. 
g. Imperialism 
Most organizations seek growth in their personnel, budget, new territory, and 
autonomy. Ambiguous and changing boundaries of these elements negatively affect the 
organizational output. 
h. Directed Change 
Changing main factors behind routines can lead to major changes in 
organizations. However, leaders’ responsiveness to hot issues and short tenure make it 
difficult for them to manage the change. 
5. Specific Prepositions 
Specific prepositions for the Organizational Behavior Model defined by Allison 
and Zelikow (1999) are described in this section. 
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a. Deterrence 
The probability of an outcome depends more on organizational factors than on 
balance and stability. For instance, in the case of the Cuban Nuclear Missile Crisis, 
organizational facts have more effect on the probability of a nuclear attack than 
superiority/inferiority of states’ nuclear power. These facts can be investigated by five 
central questions: 
• What is the control system of the enemy? 
• What brings the enemy to alert status? 
• What options will the leaders have when it is time to decide? 
• What are the enemy’s organizational procedures? 
• What is the probability that organizational processes cause an 
accidental firing? 
b. Force Posture 
Routine functions of the organizational units shape the majority of the force 
posture (i.e., weapons and systems to be produced and deployed). 
6. Evidence 
Core information about the characteristics of the organizations that constitute a 
government and its routines should be available to analysts in order to generate a 
productive analysis. Even a minimum amount of such information can significantly 
improve the analysis and predictions generated by Model I. 
7. Path Dependence Concept 
Path dependence is another valuable concept in regards to organizational behavior 
for analyzing and explaining the international participation in the JSF program. In his 
study, Paul A. David (1994) draws a line between the “genealogical” method, which 
explains current features of economic arrangements by tracing their history, and the 
“teleological” method, which explains present aspects by analyzing functions and 
objectives. Most economists, however, use the former method when it comes to 
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analyzing institutions, except the economists who follow so-called “new institutional 
economics” that emerged during the 1970s. 
David argues that even Douglass North, who supports the teleological method, 
started to use the genealogical method and quotes North: “Institutions evolve 
incrementally, connecting the past with the present and the future; …” (as cited in David, 
1994, p. 207). 
David (1994) uses the “path-dependence” phenomenon and equilibrium to 
describe the link between organizations and their history. He presents three major 
analytical findings to illuminate the path dependence of human organizations and 
understand why their history matters. 
First, David (1994) emphasizes the role of shared history in having mutual 
expectations and achieving coordination among individuals without central direction. In 
so-called “pure” coordination games in which each option is equal in terms of gains, such 
as driving on the left or the right side of the road, “common knowledge” or shared history 
determines the outcome (i.e., left-hand traffic in former British colonies). The other 
source of mutual expectations is institutionalism. The range of actions of individuals in 
an institution is generally consistent since they are assigned to well-defined roles. These 
definitive roles, especially in comprehensive institutions such as the military, require new 
members to submit to the “acculturation” routines and accept the value of their roles in 
the organization; hence, the definition of the roles is a learned process. 
Second, David (1994) suggests that organizations need channels for gathering and 
disseminating information. Once the organization establishes the channel, or the “code,” 
and the members learn how to use the code, it becomes irreversible and a sunk capital 
which the organization can only modify slowly over time. Therefore, the code of the 
organization shapes the behavior of the organization’s members.  
Third, David (1994) emphasizes that compatible or complementary functions 
make the culture and the principles of the organization easier to understand, internalize, 
and communicate. Organizations consist of several functions that can be thought of as 
gears in a mechanical watch. The gears must be compatible with each other in order for 
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the watch to operate correctly and efficiently. David illustrates this analogy as the 
performance measurement/promotion function of an organization that should be 
consistent with the recruitment function; otherwise, it becomes complex and harder to 
implement. Therefore, the early established functions can later become constraints for the 
future functions, or “unintended results of historical development” that lock the 
organization in a comparatively narrow range of goals, options, and routines. 
Finally, even though the conditions of path dependence in technological change 
are similar to microeconomic conditions that make institutions the carriers of history, it 
does not necessarily mean that technologies are just like institutions. Human 
organizations need to direct and channel the behaviors of individuals who are assigned to 
certain roles while pure technological systems do not include volitional actors. 
Information channels work more efficiently as they are used more intensively while 
machine organizations age and wear out from intensive use. The organizations require far 
greater knowledge to function than the technological systems do. This greater knowledge 
is also more prone to be lost due to higher risk of collapse of human organizations, take-
overs, or layoffs (David, 1994). 
An analysis from the organizational behavior point of view using these concepts 
and propositions can provide further insight for the JSF program and improve the 
predictions about the rationale behind Turkey’s decision. 
C. THE GOVERNMENTAL POLITICS MODEL 
In addition to the Rational Actor Model and the Organizational Behavior Model, 
Allison (1999, p. 255) proposed a third model: Governmental Politics. This model does 
not observe a single actor as Model I does or monolith organizations as Model II; 
however, it sees numerous players who have a role in national, organizational, and 
personal objectives. 
In a game called ‘politics,’ the hierarchically positioned players, who are leaders 
of governmental organizations focusing on various intranational issues rather than a 
single problem, bargain along regularized circuits (Allison & Zelikow, 1999). 
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The governmental politics model is explained by using the same components as 
defined in Allison’s book (1999, p. 294): 
1. Basic Unit of Analysis 
Governmental action as political resultant: 
Compromise, conflict, and confusion of varied interests and uneven influences 
form the decisions and actions of governments.  
Governmental actions are not only a combination of separate and independent 
decisions made by individuals and groups of players in several games, but also formal 
decisions of the government as well as its actions signify a mix of the players’ choices 
and relative impacts. 
2. Organizing Concepts 
The organizing concepts that help to better understand the Governmental Politics 
Model are briefly described in this section. 
a. Who Plays? 
The actor is neither a collection of loosely allied organizations nor a monolithic 
nation, but rather a number of individual players. 
b. “What Factors Shape players’ Perceptions, Preferences and Stands on 
the Issue at Hand?” 
(1) Parochial Priorities and Perceptions 
The factors mentioned in Model II that boost the organizational parochialism have 
an impact on the players atop of the organizations as well. An analyst can make trustable 
predictions regarding a player’s stand according to priorities arising from a position. 
(2) Goals and Interests 
Personal and organizations goals and interests can vary depending on the players’ 
position, whereas domestic political interests are widely accepted. 
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(3) Stakes and Stands 
Stakes can be defined as a mix of individual interests formed by the current issue. 
The player then takes a stand on the issue according to these stakes. 
(4) Deadlines and Faces of Issues 
Issues are raised and players are pushed to take stands due to deadlines and 
events. Surfacing of an issue usually results in the players’ awareness of different faces of 
the issue. The face of an issue can be affected by the deadline for the decision and the 
channel in which the issue is raised. 
c. “What Determines Each Player’s Impact on Results?” 
 “Bargaining advantages, ability and will to use the bargaining advantages, and 
the other players’ views on the first two” builds the political power. Authority and 
responsibility over information and resources are examples of the source of bargaining 
advantages (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 300). 
d. What Is the Game? 
Three main components of the game are as follows: 
(1) Action Channels 
An action channel can be defined as a controlled way of taking governmental 
action on a specific type of issue. Preselection of key players, determination of the 
players’ common points of entrance to the game, and division of certain advantages and 
disadvantages for every game are the factors forming the game (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999). 
(2) Rules of the Game 
Rules are generated from constitution statutes, court interpretation, executive 
orders, conventions, and culture. 
(3) Action as Political Resultant 
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Each player uses his or her power in a way that would result in advancing the 
player’s conception of national organizational and personal interests. 
3. Dominant Inference Pattern 
The explanatory power of Model III is provided by displaying the game. This 
model attempts to identify the details of the game that led to victory. Model III tries to 
include misunderstandings, foul-ups, and the sharp differences between individuals’ 
objectives and outcomes as well. 
4. General Prepositions 
General prepositions of Governmental Politics Model listed by Allison and 
Zelikow (1999) are as follows: 
a. Political Resultants 
1. Each individual player’s own preferences and positions can substantially 
affect governmental action. 
2. For every action-channel, the player’s advantages and disadvantages differ 
significantly. 
3. The advantages of each player or a mix of players show differences not 
only between action-channels but also along them. 
b. Action and Intention 
“Governmental action does not presuppose government intention. The resultant of 
behavior of representatives of a government relevant to an issue is rarely intended by any 
individual or single organization” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 306). 
1. The players of the game have different perceptions of the issue and 
different preferences for how to solve the issue. 
2. Actions are results of temporary agreements, not widely accepted 
principles. 
3. The results of a number of games do not necessarily indicate a coordinated 
action or conscious signals. 
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c. Problems and Solutions 
1. Since each player also has personal objectives, which the analyst does not 
know, behind his decisions, there is often a wide gap between what an 
analyst focuses on and a player focuses on. 
2. Substantial change decisions in government are usually a concurrence of 
chief’s issues seeking solutions and experts’ solutions looking for a 
problem. 
d. Stance and Seat 
“Where you stand is significantly affected by where you sit” (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999, p. 307). Organizational seat (i.e., the Secretary of Defense, the Chief of the Air 
Force) provides an analyst with important information about the stance organizational 
leaders take toward an issue. 
e. Chiefs and Indians 
In terms of policy making and implementation, the demands on the president, 
chiefs, staffers, and Indians are very different. The fight among the Indians of different 
departments resembles a microcosm of a higher-level action. However, the main issue for 
the Indians is getting the chiefs’ attention. 
In policy making: 
The issue looking down is options: how to preserve my leeway until 
uncertainties are clarified with time; 
The issue looking sideways is commitment: how to get others committed 
to my coalition; 
The issue looking upward is confidence: how to give the boss confidence 
to do what must be done. (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, p. 308) 
f. The 51-49 Principle 
The time the players think about policy choices and the way they defend their 
preferred choices are affected by the terms and conditions of the game. The players do 
not have much time to make important policy choices as an analyst has. The players who 
hesitate (50-50) are beaten by the ones who argue one side of the issue confidently (51-
49). 
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g. International and Intranational Relations 
It is possible for a nation to try to accomplish an international objective in the 
primary game by directly taking part in another nation’s intranational (secondary) game. 
Thus, bargaining between domestic players can affect the international bargaining game 
between nations. 
h. The Face of the Issue Differs From Seat to Seat 
A function of the group choice process is to achieve a limited agreement on the 
face of the issue. 
i. Misexpectation 
It is inevitable in the lower priority games to assume someone will think about 
someone else in terms of how “he helps me with my problem” (Allison & Zelikow, 1999, 
p. 310). 
j. Miscommunication 
Accurate communications are hard to achieve when the speed and noise level are 
combined with tendencies of perception. 
k. Reticence 
Reticence, in other words hesitancy and discretion in sharing information, may 
come with advantages for the players involved in more than one game. This behavior 
could prevent affecting more important games negatively, allow others to make their own 
evaluations regarding to a certain situation, and reduce the possibility of any dispute 
between a chief and his or her subordinates as well.  
l. Styles of Play 
Bureaucratic careerists (civilian or military), lateral-entry types, and political 
appointees have differences in their behaviors. For instance, a bureaucrat should use a 
code of conformity to endure the changes of administration and personnel. On the other 
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hand, the lateral-entry type and the political appointee are usually temporary employees 
with short tenure thus they seek short-term achievements. 
5. Specific Prepositions 
Prepositions of the Governmental Politics Model, specific for the Cuban Missile 
Crisis are described by Allison and Zelikow (1999) as follows: 
a. Use of Force in Crises 
1. The president is highly unlikely to perform forceful action without firm 
support from other chiefs. 
2. The individuals’ opinion on an issue will be affected by their personality 
and the pressure of their position. 
3. The outcome depends on how the problem was framed for action. For 
instance, if the action is framed as an incremental move, a forceful action 
is more probable. 
b. Military Action 
1. For a military action, not including a nuclear war, the decision and 
application will be on hold until the proponents convince the opponents to 
agree.  
2. The decision to use military forces is, in general, not just presidential or 
majority decisions but rather a decision made by a large plurality. 
3. A major military action would not be taken unless thorough consultations 
are carried out with the military players. 
6. Evidence 
Details of a government’s perceptions and priorities on a specific issue can be 
gathered only after extensive studies. Documents themselves are usually resultants; 
therefore, they would not include extensive information about perceptions. The way to 
properly analyze an issue is to have a number of participants still with a fresh memory of 
what happened, which is highly unlikely. 
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D. SUMMARY 
One of the questions that Allison and Zelikow try to answer in their well-known 
book, Essence of Decision: Explaining the Cuban Missile Crisis (1999), is “Why the 
United States blockaded Cuba?” According to an analyst who is using the Rational Actor 
Model, the question why seeks for the reasons that justifies the blockade as a response to 
the strategic issues that would result from existence of Soviet missiles in Cuba. On the 
other hand, for an analyst who uses the Organizational Behavior Model, the aim is to 
define such outputs of key organizations that resulted in a blockade. Finally, for a 
Governmental Politics Model analyst, the question why is for the political bargaining 
between the players with different interests, expectations, thoughts of actions and views. 
In the next chapter, this conceptual framework helps to understand and explain 
why Turkey participated in the JSF program. 
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V. ANALYSIS OF THE JSF PROGRAM FROM TURKEY’S 
POINT OF VIEW USING CONCEPTUAL MODELS 
In this chapter, Turkish participation in the JSF program is analyzed through two 
lenses: that of the Rational Actor Model (Model I) and the Organizational Behavior 
Model (Model II). The Governmental Politics Model is out of the scope of this study due 
to insufficient time to gather the required detailed information about government 
officials’ decisions and preferences, and difficulty in gathering and using personal or 
non-public data. 
A. TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE JSF PROGRAM THROUGH THE 
RATIONAL ACTOR MODEL 
The explanatory power of the Model I stems from the convenience with which an 
analyst can use it without even stepping out of his or her office. In his book, Allison 
pictures a strategic analyst from Mars who could read newspapers to describe how far a 
detached analyst could go examining facts. Considering technological advancement since 
1999, let us imagine the strategic analyst as a Martian who has internet access. He or she 
could easily—after a decent amount of reading and translation, of course—come up with 
the same hypotheses presented in this section. 
1. Organizing Concepts 
Before discussing hypotheses, it is important to identify the organizing factors of 
this model. 
a. The Agent 
Through a rational actor lens, the agent is a unified rational actor, an identified 
state: Turkey.  
b. The Goals and Objectives 
Turkey’s main objectives for participating in the JSF program were 1) to replace 
aging fighter aircraft (F-5s, F-4s, and eventually F-16s) of the TuAF with a 
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technologically advanced, force multiplier combat aircraft; 2) to benefit from industrial 
participation as much as possible to improve its industrial base and increase its know-
how; 3) to be able to access and change the software source codes for independent 
national operations and integration of indigenously designed smart munition; and 4) 
international prestige within its region (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012; Ozdemir, 2009). In light 
of these objectives, we can simply define Turkey’s objective function as shown in 
Figure 12; with a, b, c, and d being the weight of importance of the criteria and the 
criteria being technology (T), local work-share (W), source code access (A), and 
international prestige (P). 
 
Figure 12.  Objective Function for Turkey’s Decision 
The same unit, such as millions ($), should be used to value each criterion for the 
consistency of the comparison.  
c. The Alternatives 
Turkey had two alternatives to replace its fighter aircraft: participation in the Joint 
Strike Fighter program or participation in the Eurofighter program. Even though Turkey 
participated in the early phases (CDP and SDD) of the JSF program, the Eurofighter 
group—Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom—invited Turkey several times 
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to participate in the Eurofighter Typhoon program as an equal partner in 2006 (Ozdemir, 
2009). Thus, the decision was which program to participate in and commit to buy a 
certain number of aircraft, rather than whether to participate in the JSF program or not.  
d. The Action as a Rational Choice 
The need to replace aging aircraft was inevitable for Turkey. Thus, the action was 
to choose the value maximizing alternative: in which cooperative aircraft acquisition 
program to participate to modernize the combat fleet of TuAF.  
To examine the rationale behind the final choice of participation in the JSF 
program, we analyze each criterion as a separate hypothesis, which assumes the criterion 
in question was the most important factor in Turkey’s decision-making process. 
2. Hypothesis I: Technological Superiority 
Despite the debates about the technological superiority of the F-35 over the 
Eurofighter in terms of kinematic performance, transonic acceleration, integrated sensors, 
beyond visual range and high angle-of-attack flight performance as well as stealth, the 
Eurofighter is considered as a 4.5 (or “4 plus”) generation aircraft while the F-35 is a 
fifth-generation fighter (Cenciotti, 2013). 
The U.S. government defines 4.5-generation fighter aircraft as “fighter aircraft 
that have advanced capabilities, including AESA radar, high capacity data-link, enhanced 
avionics, and the ability to deploy current and reasonably foreseeable advanced 
armaments” (O’Rourke, 2009b). 
Assuming that technological superiority was the top concern for Turkey, with 
other conditions remaining the same, the F-35 would be a better value-maximizing choice 
due to its latest technology features. However, considering the technological superiority 
of Turkey’s entire combat fleet over other countries in its region would be more 
rewarding than comparing the two aircraft types head to head. 
Replacing old, fourth-generation aircraft that have high repair and maintenance, 
such as F-5s and F-4s, with a 4.5 generation aircraft, Eurofighter, as early as 2010 (TDN 
Defense Desk, 2006) might have been a more valuable option than procuring 30 
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additional Block50+ F-16s due to delays in the JSF program, given that Turkey is still 
waiting for the delivery of its first batch of two F-35As in 2018 (Sariibrahimoglu, 2016). 
In October 2006, Turkey announced that 30 F-16 Block50+ would be procured as 
a stopgap measure against potential delays of the JSF program (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
In December 2008, TAI and the prime contractor, Lockheed Martin, signed a letter of 
agreement for the assembly and flight operations of the new batch of 30 F-16 Block50+. 
All 30 aircraft were delivered by December 2012 (Turkish Aerospace Industries, 
n.d.a; 2012). 
On the flip side, the Turkish aviation industry, primarily TAI, benefited from the 
additional F-16 procurement since the final assembly and flight test were performed by 
TAI as a subcontractor of the prime contractor. In addition, TuAF had been operating F-
16s since 1987 (Bekdil, 1999) and established its operation and maintenance routines 
while the Eurofighter would have introduced a whole new acquisition, operation, and 
maintenance routine and procedures. 
In the light of these facts, since they mostly favor the JSF program, technological 
superiority might be the primary objective for Turkey in the decision process. 
3. Hypothesis II: Local Work-Share 
Another major concern for Turkey was local work-share. Although the work-
share decision was made on a best-value basis, meaning that companies from different 
partner countries competed against each other for subcontracts in the JSF program, 
Turkey’s goal was to secure enough local work-share to equal at least 50 percent of the 
total acquisition costs (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012).  
Turkey participated in the SDD phase of the JSF program but was not offered a 
guaranteed local work-share. On the other hand, the Eurofighter consortium proposed to 
Turkey a total of $9 billion local work-share in return for an order of 120 aircraft, $6.2 
billion for 80 aircraft, and $3 billion for 40 aircraft (TDN Defense Desk, 2006). Turkey 
used this offer as a kind of leverage in negotiations with the JSF consortium, and by the 
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time Turkey signed the MOU in January 2007, Turkey had already secured a work-share 
worth $4.2 billion (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
By the time of the choice, in terms of work-share, the offer of the Eurofighter 
consortium, a guaranteed $9 billion, was more favorable than an uncertain amount that 
would be determined by the JSF consortium’s best-value principle. If the top priority had 
been local work-share, the Eurofighter might have been a more value-maximizing choice. 
4. Hypothesis III: Access to Source Codes 
The third concern of Turkey about its next-generation fighter was the ability to 
access and change the source codes to operate national operations and use indigenously 
designed munitions. In 2006, the Eurofighter consortium offered full access to source 
codes of the aircraft along with the full partnership (TDN Defense Desk, 2006). On the 
flip side, the main customer of the JSF, the United States, still refuses to give source 
codes to partner countries.  
Turkey experienced a similar issue with the F-16s but was able to get access to 
source codes of F-16s in 2011, 24 years after the aircraft entered service in TuAF. Turkey 
used its dissatisfaction about lack of access to the source codes as leverage by putting the 
first JSF order in 2011 (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). 
The ability to access and change the source codes directly affects a nation’s 
independent operational capability. Based solely on the requirement for source code 
access, the Eurofighter, with a full access, might have been a more rational choice than 
the JSF, which is a closed box. 
5. Hypothesis IV: International Prestige 
Eurofighter customers include four consortium member states, the U.K., 
Germany, Italy, and Spain, and three customers outside the consortium, Austria, Saudi 
Arabia, and Oman. 
On the other hand, in addition to its technological superiority, by 2022, the JSF 
will have been operated by 12 countries across the globe, including nine partners (two of 
which are also Eurofighter customers), Australia, Canada, Denmark, Italy, Netherlands, 
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Norway, Turkey, the U.K., the United States, and three as foreign military sales, Israel, 
Japan, and Republic of Korea (see Figure 13). 
 
Figure 13.  Countries that Will Be Operating JSF by 2022. Source: Lockheed 
Martin Corporation (Retrieved: October 27, 2016). 
With its advanced technology and the power of ally operators, the JSF would be a 
more value-maximizing choice for Turkey, in terms of international prestige, since it 
would also be in accordance with TuAF’s mission of being a deterrent force among its 
region.   
B. TURKISH PARTICIPATION IN THE JSF PROGRAM THROUGH AN 
ORGANIZATIONAL BEHAVIOR MODEL 
The Rational Actor Model is a fast and useful way to analyze government actions 
since it provides the convenience of assuming actors as individuals or a monolithic 
nation, determining possible alternatives, and ranking them according to their 
satisfactoriness level for the predetermined objectives. Typically, the actors are a 
combination of loosely allied organizations with their own unique objectives, routines, 
capabilities, and culture. Moreover, an analyst can explain the action in further detail by 
defining it as an organizational output rather than a rational choice. 
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1. Organizing Concepts 
The most important organizing factors are discussed in the following subsections 
similar to the way the Rational Actor Model does. 
a. The Agent 
The actor is a collection of loosely allied organizations rather than a monolithic 
nation. In this case, participation in a joint fighter program in order to replace existing 
aging aircraft largely falls into the domain of the Turkish Ministry of National Defense, 
more specifically, the Undersecretariat for Defence Industries (UDI), TuAF, and the 
companies of the Turkish defense industrial base. 
b. Organizational Missions 
The mission of the UDI is the “management of industrialization, technology, and 
procurement programs that assures the continuous improvement of Turkey’s defense and 
security capabilities” (Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, n.d.). 
The main mission of TuAF is “to deter the enemy from its aggressive intention 
via its arms and means with superior velocity and brisance, to counteract enemy aircraft 
rapidly as soon as they enter Turkish airspace in case of an attack against the country, to 
discourage and dishearten from maintaining the war by destroying the vital military 
targets of the enemy country, and to ensure that war is won within the shortest time 
possible with least casualties” (Turkish Air Force, n.d.a). 
As a major company of the Turkish defense industrial base and a subcontractor of 
the JSF Program, the main mission of TAI is “to lead the development of Turkey's 
aerospace industry” (Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc., n.d.c). 
c. Operational Objectives, Special Capacities, and Culture 
Each major organization involved in the JSF program has its own operational 
objectives and special capabilities for the program. The Turkish UDI, as the acquisition 
authority, aims to acquire an affordable and sustainable weapon system while delivering 
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warfighters a force enabler capability and providing local work-share for defense 
companies. 
The objective of TuAF, as a user, is to gain and operate a special capability—a 
new combat aircraft—in order to be “an air and space force, effective on its continent and 
leader in its region” (Turkish Air Force, 2013). 
The goal of TAI, as a profit-seeking company, can be summarized as profit, 
growth, and increased know-how gained from the program. 
The oldest and the largest of these major organizations is TuAF. Thus, the 
organizational culture of TuAF is further analyzed in the section “Organizational Culture 
of Turkish Air Force” in order to illustrate two of the important organizational aspects 
that Allison and Zelikow (1999, p. 167) suggest:  
• Special systems or technologies operated by the organization 
• Professional norms for recruitment and tenure of personnel 
d. The Action as an Organizational Output 
According to the Organizational Behavior Model, rather than being a value-
maximizing choice, Turkish participation in the JSF program is an organizational output 
largely derived from “objectives,” “sequential attention to objectives,” “SOPs, programs, 
and repertoires” of the organizations constituting the government (Allison & Zelikow, 
1999). 
2. Organizational Culture of Turkish Air Force 
The primary operation of TuAF is to fly its aircraft for air superiority, combat, 
training, combat search and rescue, and military transportation. All other functions, from 
recruiting to construction, from acquisition to decommissioning of aircraft, from logistics 
to health and safety services, are established to support this very function. 
As a result of this main function, the leadership of TuAF, by its nature, has been 
dominated by pilots, especially fighter pilots. Each and every commander of TuAF 
between 1995 and 2015 was a jet pilot (see Table 7). Eighty percent of the commanders 
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were assigned to at least one NATO position, while 50 percent of them were assigned to 
a position or training in the United States throughout their career. 
Table 7.   Background Information about Commanders of Turkish Air Force 
between 1995 and 2015. Adapted from Turkish Air Force (n.d.c). 
# Term of Office Jet 
Pilot 
NATO Assignment US Assignment 
30th 2013 – 2015 Yes Operation Deny Flight - 
29th 2011 – 2013 Yes NAPMAa Air Command and Staff College 
28th 2009 – 2011 Yes - - 
27th 2007 – 2009 Yes AIRSOUTH HQb Air Command and Staff College 
26th 2005 – 2007 Yes AIRSOUTH HQb Air Command and Staff College 
25th 2003 – 2005 Yes 6th Allied Tactical Air 
Force 
Washington Military Attaché 
24th 2001 – 2003 Yes - - 
23rd 1999 – 2001 Yes AIRSOUTH HQb; 
Military Representative 
Pilot Training 
22nd 1997 – 1999 Yes AIRSOUTH HQb - 
21st 1995 – 1997 Yes AIRSOUTH HQb; 
6th Allied Tactical Air 
Force 
- 
a NAPMA: NATO AEW&C Program Management Agency  
b HQ: Headquarters 
 
Moreover, as mentioned in Chapter III in detail, all of the fighter aircraft that 
Turkish fighter pilots flown since 1952 were USAF-based aircraft. Not only pilots, but 
also ground support personnel from logisticians to technicians, who procure, operate, and 
maintain these aircraft and support their flights have been accustomed to USAF-based 
standard/emergency operating procedures, manuals, and routines. 
Another aspect of path dependency between the USAF and TuAF is shared 
history. According to a RAND study (Larson et al., 2004), Turkey is the third most 
frequent partner of the United States, having participated in 23 coalition operations, seven 
of which are United Nations operations, after the United Kingdom (29) and France (28). 
Turkey and the United States became partners in training and education as an 
expected consequence of acquisition of USAF-based aircraft for over 50 years. USAF has 
been the major training partner of TuAF not only for pilots, but also maintenance, supply, 
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engineering, education, avionics, and navigation personnel. As shown in Table 8, the 
U.S. maintains the second-largest International Military Education and Training program 
with Turkish Armed Forces (Pawlyk, 2016). 
Table 8.   Top Five International Military Education and Training Programs of 
the United States by Fiscal Year 2015. Adapted from 
U.S. Department of State (n.d.). 
























TOTAL 93,000 108,000 105,788 105,788 99,197 105,573 107,474 
Pakistan 2,261 5,000 4,055 4,868 5,000 5,000 4,800 
Turkey 3,208 4,992 3,990 3,839 3,415 3,300 3,300 
Jordan 3,109 3,772 3,760 3,650 3,608 3,800 3,800 
Lebanon 2,278 2,500 2,476 2,372 2,849 2,250 2,250 
Tunisia 1,700 1,945 1,950 1,837 2,155 2,300 2,000 
 
Despite the influence of the United States and USAF-based aircraft, Turkey also 
participates in European consortiums. In 1984, eight European countries, including 
Turkey, set up the Future Large Aircraft Exploratory Group to find a solution to the 
perceived capability gap of European military air transport fleets. In 2000, the group 
chose the proposal of the Airbus Military Corporation, A400M, over Ukrainian and 
American options mostly due to industrial and financial aspects rather than technical ones 
(Joana & Smith, 2006). The first aircraft was successfully delivered to TuAF on May 12, 
2014 (Özen & Akyıl, 2014). As of 2016, the first three TuAF A400Ms of a total order of 
ten have been delivered (Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, 2015). 
If Turkey had selected the Eurofighter over the JSF to replace the aging fighter 
aircraft of TuAF, the Eurofighter would not have been the first European military aircraft 
procured by Turkey, but it would have been the first European-based jet fighter of TuAF. 
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The influence of USAF-based combat aircraft, fighter pilots, NATO missions, and 
U.S. education and training programs on TuAF culture has persisted since 1950s. The 
JSF program will be another rivet to strengthen the links. 
3. Other Organizational Factors 
TAI is another major organization effective in the JSF program. Even though 
foreign shares of TAI were acquired by Turkish shareholders in 2005 (Turkish Aerospace 
Industries, Inc., n.d.c), TAI had been a joint venture between TUSAŞ and Lockheed 
Martin. The personnel of TAI have been proud of successful assembly and delivery of 
more than 300 F-16s as well as other modernizations of Lockheed Martin F-16s and C-
130s since the foundation (Turkish Aerospace Industries, Inc., n.d.b).  
The shared history between Lockheed Martin and TAI, similar to the one between 
TuAF and the USAF, might have played an important role in the selection process of 
Turkey’s new generation fighter acquisition. 
As David suggests (1994), early established “codes” in an organization can 
become constraints in the future. In the JSF case, one of the early establishments, 
Turkey’s membership in NATO, might have ruled out other options, such as the Russian 
Sukhoi PAK FA T-50 and Chinese Chengdu J-20 and Shenyang J-31, even from the 
beginning of the capability requirement, which can be considered as an output of SOPs 
and routines in a huge organization like NATO, consisting of 28 countries.  
Another huge organization, the European Union (EU) might have affected the fate 
of Turkey’s participation in the Eurofighter program. Turkey applied to accede to the EU 
in 1987 and has been a candidate for full membership since December 11, 1999 
(“Turkey–EU relations,” n.d.). The European Council decided not to open eight chapters 
out of 13 chapters in 2006. In 2007, France declared that it would not allow five chapters 
to open, including one previously blocked by the European Council (“Turkey–EU 
relations,” n.d.). This decline in Turkey-EU negotiations coincided with Turkey’s 
decision to proceed with the JSF program despite the Eurofighter consortium’s offer of 
full partnership and $9 billion worth of local work-share (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012).  
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C. SUMMARY 
From a rational actor point of view, technological superiority and international 
prestige criteria favored the decision to participate in the JSF program while local work-
share and source code access favored the Eurofighter program. A risk-averse rational 
actor would have chosen participation in the Eurofighter program because of the JSF’s 
higher uncertainty of work-share and software access as well as its overruns in costs and 
delivery schedule. However, Turkey, supposing that its industrial base would manage to 
secure sufficient competitive contracts and the long partnership with the United States 
since 1950s would eventually result in an access to the source codes, chose the JSF over 
the Eurofighter. 
From an organizational behavior point of view, the organizations that affected 
Turkey’s decision to participate in the JSF program varies from huge organizations, such 
as NATO and the EU, to domestic aerospace companies such as TAI and TEI. The shared 
history and path dependence between those Turkish organizations and their foreign 
counterparts might have paved the way for Turkey’s involvement in F-35 acquisition as 
well as their SOPs and routines in effect.  
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VI. CONCLUSION AND SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE 
RESEARCH 
This chapter provides a summary and conclusion in regards to Turkish 
participation in the JSF program. 
A. CONCLUSION 
The Joint Strike Fighter (JSF), with its total cost of nearly $400 billion, is the 
largest and the most expensive development and acquisition program in history, with 
eight cost-sharing participant countries, which are the United Kingdom, Italy, 
Netherlands, Turkey, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway (Sullivan, 2016).  
The main objective of the program is to develop and produce the fifth-generation, 
stealth, multi-role fighter that will replace aging fighter, strike, and ground attack aircraft 
for the United States Navy, Air Force, Marine Corps, and eight allies (U.S. Government 
Accountability Office, 2000). 
Turkey, one of the participant countries of the JSF program, established the 
foundation of Turkish aviation in 1911 (Turkish Air Force, n.d.b), only eight years after 
the first flight of the Wright Brothers in 1903. During the 1920s and 1930s, Turkey was 
one of the few nations that had indigenous aircraft designs and production. After World 
War II, Turkey started to receive military assistance from the United States under the 
Truman Doctrine, which provided a tremendous improvement for the TuAF aircraft 
inventory while the fledgling Turkish aviation industry became redundant and did not 
stand a chance against low-priced military aid aircraft (Güvenç & Yanık, 2012). In 1952, 
Turkey’s membership to NATO also introduced the first jet fighters to TuAF’s fleet. 
Since then, TuAF has acquired and operated only USAF-based fighter aircraft 
(Karaağaç, 2010). The F-35A, the USAF and export variant of the JSF, will be the last 
ring of this chain. 
The JSF program is unprecedented not only for its scope and costs, but also for 
the early participation of the partners in the development process. Six partners 
participated in the Concept Demonstration Phase on three different levels; the United 
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Kingdom as the only Full Collaborative Partner; Netherlands, Norway, and Denmark as 
Associate Partners; and Italy and Canada as Informed Partners (Birkler et al., 2001). 
Turkey participated in this phase as a Foreign Military Sales Major Participant, with a 
$6.2 million contribution (Birkler et al., 2001). 
During the next phase, the System Development and Demonstration Phase, the 
foreign participant nations were assigned to one of three levels based on the amount they 
financially contributed. Turkey participated as a Level III partner with a contribution of 
$175 million (Bolkcom & Murch, 2007). 
Unlike the previous phases, in the Production, Sustainment, and Follow-On 
Development Phase, there are no levels of participation and costs are divided between the 
participants in proportion to each partner’s planned purchase amount. Turkey plans to 
buy 100 F-35As and ordered six F-35As (two in LRIP-10 and four in LRIP-11) as of 
2016 (Undersecretariat for Defence Industries, 2016). 
Interdisciplinary studies generally provide senior decision makers more value and 
insight than single aspect analyses, such as financial analysis of the JSF program. This 
study tries to facilitate different disciplines under a Master of Business Administration 
(MBA). Such disciplines include acquisition management, financial management, 
business modeling, strategic management, and foreign policy. Graham T. Allison’s 
conceptual models happen to be a useful tool for such multidisciplinary and 
multidimensional analysis. 
Graham T. Allison and Philip Zelikow (1999) suggest three conceptual models for 
foreign policy analysis. Model I, the Rational Actor Model, tries to explain the actions of 
a government assuming that it is a unified rational actor who is trying to make value-
maximizing decisions according to available alternatives and existing objectives. Model 
II, the Organizational Behavior Model, supposes that the actor is a set of loosely allied 
organizations and the behaviors of these organizations, in conformance to their routines, 
standard operating procedures, and culture shortly their “codes,” shape the output. Model 
III, the Governmental Politics Model, suggests that the action is a result of political 
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games, in which positional and personal goals and interests are in play, and the 
bargaining among the “players,” the government leaders. 
Foreign policy analysts, as well as ordinary people, consciously or unconsciously, 
use the Rational Actor Model in everyday life to understand and explain international 
events and governmental actions. The explanatory power of the model stems from 
empirical predictions that can be made from an office chair—thanks to the internet—just 
by gathering public information about an issue. However, without any information about 
an actor’s actual objectives, estimates, and alternatives, an imaginative analyst can 
unintentionally come up with implausible objectives and conclude any story as consistent 
and possible. Model II requires more information than the first model, information about 
the history, routines, standard operating procedures, and culture of the organizations that 
form the governmental actor. This model provides more conceivable explanations and 
insight, especially for the actions considered irrational from a rational actor point of view. 
Model III requires even more information than the second model, information about 
personal and positional goals and interests of government leaders. In most cases, an 
analyst who manages to gather such information from one side to conduct a Model III 
analysis can only access sufficient information about the other side to conduct a Model I 
analysis, since a Model III analysis requires personal interviews, memoirs, and diaries. 
Accessing such sources gets harder each day after the event. 
 In this study, Turkey’s decision to participate in the JSF program, especially in 
the Production, Sustainment, and Follow-On Development Phase, is analyzed through the 
Rational Actor and Organizational Behavior Models. From a rational actor point of view, 
publicly available information shows that Turkey had four major objectives in the 
acquisition of a next-generation multi-role combat aircraft. The JSF program is a more 
rational alternative in terms of technological superiority and international prestige while 
the Eurofighter option is more value-maximizing in terms of local work-share and access 
to source codes. Since the actual priorities and weight put on each criterion by the 
decision makers are unknown, the first model cannot conclude the participation decision 
either as rational or irrational. Model II turns out to be useful at this point. With further 
detail about the history, routines, standard operating procedures, and culture of the major 
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organizations that played a role in the decision process, the Organizational Behavior 
Model provides more insight. Turkey’s history of partnership with the United States, 
especially the USAF’S and TuAF’s shared history since 1952, the common combat 
aircraft and their routines, SOPs, and the partnership between the American prime 
contractor, Lockheed Martin and Turkish aerospace company, TAI, since 1980s, help to 
understand and explain the preference for the JSF program over the Eurofighter 
consortium. In addition to these strong signs of path dependency, TuAF’s fighter pilot 
dominated culture might have played a role in this organizational output. 
The Governmental Politics Model is kept out of the scope due to the constraints in 
gathering and using personal or non-public data and the time to gather the required 
detailed information about the objectives and preferences of the government officials and 
corporate leaders. 
B. SUGGESTIONS FOR FUTURE RESEARCH 
This MBA project analyzes Turkish participation in the JSF program with only 
two of the three models of Graham T. Allison. A look through the third lens, the 
Governmental Politics Model, would provide a greater understanding and an interesting 
angle regarding Turkey’s decision to participate in the JSF program. 
Second, further research about other JSF partner nations using the same models 
could offer an opportunity to compare how the objectives and actions of states, 
organizations, and governmental leaders differ due to rational estimates, organizational 
culture, and personal/positional interests. 
Third, additional research might analyze the decisions of the partners of the 
Eurofighter consortium, especially the ones that also participate in the JSF program: the 
United Kingdom and Italy. Such research could reveal both sides of the story. 
Last, but not least, this study might inform future research on plans of current 
participants or prospective buyers of the JSF program by providing a guide for applying 
conceptual models to joint acquisition programs, a point of reference and an opportunity 
for comparison. 
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